In the early 2000s, Simon Hix and his colleagues declared EP constitutes a good laboratory to test theories and hypotheses about legislative or party behavior. However, scholars mainly focused on roll-call votes analysis allowing them to investigate voting behavior, coalitions formation as well as activities in technical committees. We argue that work in Parliament should not be investigated without considering constituency work. Surprisingly, despite the institutionalization of district work, only a few studies focused on micro-level linkages between MEPs and citizens. The results show that MEPs are in contacts with citizens having matter with the EU but not directly with their constituents. In the district, MEPs are more experts of the EU than members of the community. By investigating day-to-day contacts between citizens and their MEPs, this paper offers a new perspective on the debate about the democratic deficit of EP and EU institutions.
Introduction
This paper deals with the neglected question of the actual practice of political representation at the European level. In the context of the European Union (EU), the Parliament (EP) is the single directly popularly elected institution. Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) hold a unique role in being the direct linkages between citizens and the EU institutions. Scholars' interest for the functioning of the EP is thus significant and growing; following the evolution and the increasing visibility of the EP. On the one hand, this interest leads to a better knowledge of what happens inside the EP (Hix, Noury, & Roland, 2007) . However, scholars do not focus on the MEPs activities outside the EP (Farrell & Scully, 2010) . Hence, despite the critical position of the EP in the process of political representation at the European level, scholars know only a little about the practices of the agents of representation.
Going outside the EP for investigating district work is not only important because of the key roles of MEPs in the representation process. District work and non-legislative tasks are becoming more visible at both the national and supranational levels following global trends.
Since the end of the Cold War, literature highlights the transformation of European representative democracies characterized by the growing distrust in political institutions that do not spare the EP. The 2008 financial crisis reinforced the feeling of distrust in politics, particularly in southern Europe (Hernández & Kriesi, 2016) . The linkages between citizens and political actors have become more salient, and citizens more demanding towards their representatives (Andre, Depauw, & Beyens, 2015) . However, despite the work of Eulau and Karps (1977) , until recently scholars adopted a restrictive definition of political representation, limiting the capacity to assess the direct link between citizens and MPs. This restriction finds its origin in the seminal theoretical work of Pitkin (1972) . Representation is associated with policy congruence (Eulau & Karps, 1977) ; citizens are evaluating their representatives in terms 2 of policy similarity. It leads to an overestimation of the power of the parties in the process of political representation; Literature considers MPs as agents respecting the party discipline (Converse & Pierce, 1986) and to the omission of activities taking place outside the parliamentary chambers (Thomassen & Andeweg, 2004) . Hence, despite it being an essential element of accountability, constituency service is largely ignored by scholars investigating the practice representation. At the European level, there is virtually no study about constituency work except a Ph.D. dissertation (Tomkova, 2014) . Hence, this paper contributes to a better knowledge of both the political representation at the European level and of the consequences on Members of Parliaments' behavior of the evolution of citizens' demands.
Mobilizing ethnographic data, the purpose of this paper is to investigate the actual practice of political representation on the ground through the observation of French MEPs' activities in their district. According to Fenno (1978) , to understand representative democracy in action, it requires to look not only at what is happening in the chamber but also to go beyond the walls of the Parliament, in the district: What do MEPs do in their districts? By investigating MEPs constituency work, this paper offers a new perspective on the debate about the democratic deficit of the EU (Moravcsik, 2002; Rittberger, 2003) . It could challenge the traditional vision of MEPs disconnected from their electoral bases that would lead to a rareness of contacts between MEPs and their constituents (Clark & Rohrschneider, 2009; van der Eijk & Franklin, 1991) . Hence, if this paper focuses on a particular part of MEPs' activities, it must be linked to the literature about parliamentary democracy at the European level.
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Constituency representation at the European level: State of the art
The process of political representation at the European level is debated through the question of a democratic deficit in the EU. Until last decades, the voluminous theoretical literature focusing on this issue contrasts with a lack of empirical investigations (Schmitt & Thomassen, 1999) .
EU is particularly outstanding for understanding the multi-dimensionality and dynamic nature (Pitkin, 1972) of political representation. MEPs, coming from diverse national polities and they are under pressure from various national interests' groups. They interact each other and are subject to the multiplicity of institutional constraints. It leads to the multiplicity of allegiances and a sophisticated prioritization (Costa, 2002) . Several authors investigate these allegiances focusing on diverse aspects of MEPs representational roles. The most common operationalization is related to the functionalist conception of representation (Wahlke, Eulau, & Buchanan, 1962) namely the focus and style of representation. According to Katz (1997), MEPs are more or less oriented toward the representation of national interest, European priorities, and constituency interests. However, the differences between MEPs and the determinants of the foci are not explained. The same limit can be addressed to Wessels (1999) .
Afterwards, Scully and Farrell (2003) find four discriminant factors: importance accorded to the representation of national party (voters); social group representation; representation of broad interests (national or European) and importance is given to the parliamentary activities.
They show that MEPs prioritize they activities giving more importance to a particular "principal" (Scully & Farrell, 2003) . They also tried to explain differences in how MEPs perceive their role but they failed to provide robust results, as they recognized themselves (Scully & Farrell, 2003) . Brack and Costa (2013) detail the situation of French MEPs showing that focus of representation depends mainly on political orientations. They also show the difficulties in importing local issues into the EP due to institutional constraints.
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These studies provide an interesting picture of MEPs' complex set of attitudes, but the link with their activities and behaviors remains unrecognized. This critic is addressed to the functionalist approach and not only to its application to MEPs. As an answer to this limit, Beauvallet and Michon (2007) illustrate the local dimensions of MEPs' behavior. They show that local ties are not sufficient to run for EP seats which depend mainly on political parties. Within the EP, institutional constraints limit the possibility to import local issues, but opportunities are set up by MEPs sharing common interests (Costa, 2001 ).
Other scholars provide similar results by analyzing parliamentary questions (Proksch & Slapin, 2011; Raunio, 1996) . National opposition parties often use parliamentary questions at the European level as an alternative source of information (Proksch & Slapin, 2011, p. 72) . Also, Costa and Brack (2014) did not find a systematic use of written questions to import local issues at the EP. The focus is mainly European. However, the authors note that Eurosceptic MEPs concentrate more on local and national issues than their colleagues.
As a result, the time spent for the district is rather short, and MEPs appear to be more influenced by their party membership and their opinion about European integration (Hix et al., 2007) .
However, scholars mainly focus on the work inside the EP when, as argued by Fenno (1978) , parliamentary work cannot be correctly analyzed without taking into account the work outside the Parliament. Legislative work and district work are two sides of the same coin. Scholars overlook this part of MEPs work despite its institutionalization (turquoise weeks may be dedicated to district work).
Hence, the literature gives various incentives to explore MEPs district work. The institutional constraints limit the possibilities to take advantage of parliamentary instruments to offer constituency service. To assure a connection with their constituents, they must work differently, and activities in the district can be one solution. In France, this pattern is observed at the national level. The literature considers the weakness of the house as a key element explaining why MPs focus more on district work than on their legislative tasks (Costa & Kerrouche, 2009; Costa & Poyet, 2016) . Also, the institution itself incites MEPs to spend time in their district by organizing weeks that can be dedicated to district work (but not only). Despite this double incentive and a real interest in the question of parliamentary representation at the European level, the literature surprisingly neglected this aspect of MEPs work. The purpose of this article is thus to fill this gap by investigating the day-to-day contacts between MEPs and their constituents.
French MEPs district work: Theoretical expectations
Before presenting the hypotheses about MEPs district work, the first section discusses the factors inciting MEPs to develop ties in their district. The assumption is that MEPs are not subject to the same incentives than MPs and that this difference will lead to a different practice of district work.
Incentives to offer constituency service
The literature considers that district work is an answer to an electoral incentive. MPs spend time in their constituency to develop their reputation that can be translated into an electoral resource (Carey & Shugart, 1995) . The European elections are regionalized, and the system differs from one member-state to another even if the proportional base is present in all countries. In France, the electoral system for European elections is proportional with closed-list and large district 6 magnitude. Hence, this system does not give incentives for cultivating personal vote and, thus, to spend time in the district (Carey & Shugart, 1995; Dudzinska, Poyet, Costa, & Wessels, 2015) . However, when the number of parties is high, candidates, mainly seniors, and frontbenchers, are invited by their party to develop ties in their districts. The gain is, thus, not individual but collective (Uslaner, 1985) . Also, European Parliament might be considered by politicians as a step before running for local or national elections (Scarrow, 1997; van Geffen, 2016) . In France, other elections require strong local ties regardless the level of governance.
Hence, MEPs may find a strategic incentive for spending time in the district (Høyland, Hobolt, & Hix, 2017) .
In addition to the career factors, the institutional design is a constraint that limits the possibility to import local issues in the EP; constituency work may be an answer to the lack of democratic legitimacy of the EP. Hence, it can increase MEPs responsiveness and legitimacy as well as, indirectly, the EP's one (Costa, 2001) . The institutional constraint inside the EP constitutes, thus, an opportunity for MEPs to develop local ties outside the chamber. More than being an answer to incentives from the electoral system, constituency service is a response to the weakness of the EP. If MEPs do not need to hunt personal votes for winning the next election, other incentives coexist and justify an exploration of constituency work. Moreover, since district work is dedicated to aiming other goals, it would be different from their national counterparts who must secure their reelection.
French MEPs activities in their district: Research hypotheses
Because of the lack of studies about MEPs district work, the theoretical expectations will be driven by studies investigating national MPs constituency activities as well as by an inductive reasoning.
In France, the primary activity in the district is casework namely when MPs take care of citizens individual issues (Costa & Poyet, 2016) . As argued by Kerrouche (2009) MPs emails are not relevant here. Also, Beauvallet and Michon (2007) show that MEPs spend time for casework, but the frequency of this activity remains overlooked. Two different expectations may occur: First, the irrelevance of individual issues might indicate that MEPs are not a last chance administrative shelter, neither inside the EP nor in their district. Second, it is also expected that individual issues are irrelevant in mails because they are processed in the district during specific appointments. However, this argument would be incorrect since the recent literature shows that casework is moving from meetings at politicians' office to online demands (Lilleker & Koc-Michalska, 2013) . Hence, the expectation is (H1): by contrast to national MPs, French MEPs will devote limited time for casework and surgeries.
The second activity in the district is the social events. In these activities, which are mainly festive and commemorative, MPs are not solicited as they are for surgeries. Social events are strongly related to the seniority and experience of MPs. Norton and Wood (1990) argue that junior MPs have more incentives than the previous generation due to the stronger expectations of citizens. After a first period of "incumbency" during which MPs devote a considerable share of time in the constituency, MPs have only to maintain their electoral base (Fenno, 1978) . Also, because of a lack of time, senior and high resourced MPs will not assure this presence themselves but through their collaborators and a professional communication (newsletter, media, and social networks). Social events are firstly symbolic since they allow the MPs to 8 show that they are members of the community composing the district (Eulau & Karps, 1977 Third, maybe more important in the context of EP is the link with social and interests' groups.
In France, MPs contacts with these groups in the constituency are rather limited. These activities represent only 9% of the time spent in the district by French MPs (Costa & Poyet, 2016) . In the case of the EP, the expectation is that these meetings are much more frequent than in the national context. Two reasons explain this expectation: first, interest groups and lobbying have a real and measured impact on MEPs preferences (Eising, 2007; Marshall, 2010) . If this influence takes place mainly inside the EP, MEPs may also play the game in the district with local groups. Second, the EU may be a financial contributor for local projects integrating social groups like sports clubs or cultural organizations. Also, the same pattern is expected with political groups, parties, and local governments. The EU is also a provider of a financial fund designated to cities and regions. MEPs can play a moderator role between local administration and the EU. The local parties may also incite MEPs to provide this support to the municipalities they control. Hence, MEPs may play the role of moderator between these groups and the European administration. The role is not only to support for preparing an application. MEPs can then defend these requests. Unfortunately, the empirical design of this paper, focusing on district work, will not be able to appreciate the last step of the process. However, previous literature already highlighted these form of pork-barrel politics (Scholl, 1985) . Hence, the third hypothesis is (H3) contacts with local and social and political groups are frequent in the district.
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Finally, a top-down process may also occur when MEPs spend time in their district (Beauvallet & Michon, 2007) . Top-down means all activities by which MEPs represent the parliamentary institution. In France, at the national level, this process is rather limited even if it exists.
Information meetings are organized at on a regular basis by most of MPs (Costa & Poyet, 2016) .
At the European level, in a context of lack of legitimacy, it is expected that these activities are much more developed than at the national level: (H4) a high frequency of events like information meeting, visit school and visit to the industrial actors.
Data and method
The paper will use the data compiled in the IMPLOC project, coordinated by Olivier Costa and Jean-Benoit Pilet. Its ambition is to investigate the actual practice of representation through MPs' and MEPs constituency work. The project adopts a comparative perspective mobilizing data from France and Belgium, but, here, only the French data are considered. Between 2012 and 2013, 53 MPs (50) and MEPs (3) have been observed during two consecutive days when they are in their constituency. Since the empirical design is qualitative, the necessity of a robust representative sample is not required. However, the three selected MEPs are very different in terms of gender (two men and one woman), party membership (one member of the EPP, one of the ALDE and one of the S&D) and seniority (one MEP is a newcomer, one starts his second term, and the third was reelected three times). Concerning MEPs, the dataset compiles 21 events grouped in eleven categories.
The qualitative methodological framework is double. It mobilizes moderate participant observation completed with an interview. Observation allows investigating the reality of the contacts with citizens. A systematic approach is adopted with the application of a strict protocol.
Observers fill a particular document for each event indicating its content. This approach has a double advantage: First, MEPs may adopt different behavior regarding the situation (Fenno, 1978) . By always evaluating MEPs behavior on the same precise criteria our sample can deal with this. Second, it facilitates the comparison between MEPs. The typology of events is based on previous studies about French and German MPs through the CITREP project (Costa & Poyet, 2016) . Our hypotheses are based on these categories. For each event and each MEP, the observer describes the observation by pointing all interesting behavioral features of MEPs which cannot be added to the above document. The objective is also to retrieve all informal discussions between MEPs, their collaborators and other actors that cannot be considered as events.
The interviews complete the observations. Their goal is to understand the opinion MEPs have about their work. The mixed-method approach using in this paper has one advantage: the mutual complementarity between the two methods. Observation allows the researchers to investigate the reality of constituency work, but the meaning of the activities remain hard to understand.
On the other hand, scholars may understand the meaning given by MEPs to their activities.
A comparison with French national MPs is provided in the tables and figure. It helps to highlight the specificity of MEPs district work.
Empirical results
Despite the heterogeneity of the activities, MEPs district work is rather homogeneous, and all MEPs organize their district work along the same line. Globally, the hypotheses find support.
Overall, it appears that French MEPs district work is different to what it is observed at the 11 national level in France. The detailed analysis will highlight a practice of representation which is, to some degree, exclusive even if it does not seem this is intentional. Figure 1 summarizes the type of events that were observed. The first result is the absence of appointments with citizens (for solving individual issues) when it is the most frequent activity among national MPs. Five reasons may explain this lack: First, the size of the district leads to a limited accessibility to the MEP. As observed at the national level, surgeries are not as frequent in large rural districts as they are in the small urban ones (Costa & Poyet, 2016) .
MEPs as an insiders' representatives
Compared to rural national constituencies, the districts for European elections are much bigger; leading to a stronger effect of this factor. Second, casework may take place outside the surgeries as, for example, during a visit to a firm. These decentralized surgeries are observed with an surgeries become more-and-more virtual through social networks and emails since it is free and effortless (Lilleker & Koc-Michalska, 2013) . The increasing number of emails received by
MEPs is pointed by Michon (2008) . The size of the districts might also reinforce this factor.
However, this argument must be balanced: according to Michon (2008) , each MEP receives, in average, about ten emails relative to individual issues every week. This number reaches a hundred or so for French MPs (Kerrouche, 2009 referring to the theory of personal vote (Cain, Ferejohn, & Fiorina, 2013) , such activities procure only limited advantages. According to Norris (2004) , the electoral system makes MEPs accountable to their party and not directly to the voters. However, the explanation is not sufficient. In Germany, for example, some MPs are elected through a comparable electoral system, but their participation to such of local celebrations is real and similar to French MPs practice (Costa & Siefken, 2014 The results show that the indifference towards MEPs explains the different pattern. On the one hand, for the organizers of events, the presence of MEPs is not a promise of success. On the contrary, for the MEPs, participating in local events is not relevant since voters do not recognize most of them.
Representing and importing Europe in the district
The traditional explanatory patterns of district work do not apply for French MEPs. It does not mean that the view of district work as service and symbolic responsiveness (Eulau & Karps, 1977) is not relevant but that these components of representative's tasks are differently One MEP focuses on agriculture, and cattle/pig farms. These sectors have a considerable role in the local economy and directly and indirectly hire a significant share of workers. Also, they become increasingly dependent on the EU, mainly through the CAP. Similarly, free trade agreements within the EU and between the EU and other countries affect these sectors (Carter & Smith, 2008) . The observer notes that the goal of the visits was to learn more about the actual situation of the farmers and the consequence of EU policies.
Beyond this illustration, the observations and interviews also show that contacts with social and political groups are frequent. MEPs are a contact-person to deal with EU matters not only for social groups but also and mainly for political groups: This result fits with previous literature. Michon (2008, p. 12 ) also shows that the treatment of demands from the civil society is dependent on the share of a common political network. MEPs tend to reserve a more positive answer to individuals they know. The proximity may not be only ideological, but this factor is important.
More generally, the data portray a double process: First, there is a bottom-up practice of political representation: the district is a source of information (and local requests) for MEPs. However, according to the previous literature, this information is not directly processed in their legislative and control tasks to defend the interests of the district in a strict sense (Brack & Costa, 2013) .
Further studies are needed to know what extent district work may lead to specific requests directly to the Commission and other EU agencies; behind the closing doors of meeting rooms (pork-barrel politics).
Second, there is a top-down process through a hard communication about the work in the EP.
For example, an important farmers union organized a public meeting to allow a MEP to present her successes and failures on this issue. Also, the data show that MEPs are also used as a communication channel from the EU to the citizens and social groups. In both processes, the EU is the main discussed issue (figures 2 and 3). It means that the MEPs are invited to talk about the EU and that MEPs organize their district work with a strong focus on EU matters. There are only two events where the EU was not mentioned namely a party meeting (at the time of the fieldwork, one MEP was a party leader) and a private meeting with former colleagues from the municipal council of a large city. At the national level, this strong connection between district work and political agenda is not observed. French MPs rarely evoke issues that are on the legislative agenda (Costa & Poyet, 2016) . 
Concluding remarks
Scholars became increasingly interested in MEPs' behavior but overlooked their activities in the district despite their importance for legislative work. The goal of this paper was to investigate MEPs day-to-day practice of political representation.
The analyses suggest that MEPs district work is strongly connected to their European status. In their district, MEPs are the experts on European affairs more than members of the community.
MEPs are moderators who facilitate the relationship between citizens and the EU. They are facilitators who can deal with the complexity of the EU.
For the debate about the democratic deficit of the EU, this paper brings a new perspective.
District work is not disconnected from the parliamentary work and the traditional tasks of MEPs. It is both an input (information) and output (communication) for parliamentary tasks.
The observations and the interviews suggest that MEPs do not suffer from a lack of legitimacy.
Citizens who have a direct and strong matter with the EU can deal with MEPs. Also, MEPs are present to explain the work in the EP to the people. However, it remains a significant share of citizens who do not meet or even see their MEPs. In that respect, this article shows that even by taking district work into account, the democratic deficit of the EU is still a reality. Moreover, Ones would explain this result by the lack of electoral incites. Since the personal vote is scared A detailed look at the work in committee may be necessary since the previous literature already showed the role of the district in the assignment process (Bowler & Farrell, 1995) .
